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THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR
and
ITS BEARING ON THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

BY

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

.....Donald Malcolm Greer.....

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The Indo-Pakistani War
and
Its Bearing on the Triple Alliance.

By
Indira Gandhi M.P.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a significant event in the history of South Asia. It was fought between India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir. The war began on September 6, 1965, and ended on January 8, 1966. The conflict was a result of the long-standing dispute over Kashmir, which has been a source of tension between the two countries since 1947. The war was fought on two fronts: the eastern front in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and the western front in West Pakistan (now Pakistan). India emerged as the victor in the war, and the conflict resulted in a ceasefire on January 8, 1966. The war had a significant impact on the relationship between India and Pakistan, and it also had a bearing on the Triple Alliance, which was formed in 1954 between India, Pakistan, and the United States.

The Triple Alliance was a strategic partnership between India, Pakistan, and the United States. It was formed in 1954, and it was designed to provide mutual defense and security for the three countries. The alliance was a result of the Cold War, and it was a key element of the US strategy to contain the Soviet Union. The alliance was a significant factor in the relationship between India and Pakistan, and it also had a bearing on the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The war was a result of the long-standing dispute over Kashmir, which has been a source of tension between the two countries since 1947. The war was fought on two fronts: the eastern front in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and the western front in West Pakistan (now Pakistan). India emerged as the victor in the war, and the conflict resulted in a ceasefire on January 8, 1966. The war had a significant impact on the relationship between India and Pakistan, and it also had a bearing on the Triple Alliance, which was formed in 1954 between India, Pakistan, and the United States.

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izing all this, were probably influenced by the possibility of the penetration of the continent.

The blend of these, and perhaps some minor influences, account for the persistence and steadfastness of Italian ambitions with reference to North Africa and in particular Tripoli; ambitions which were manifested back in the days when Italian unity was little more than a dream. As early as 1838, three years after Turkey had proclaimed Tripoli a vilayet of the Empire, Mazzini and other prominent statesmen of the day, looking into the future, asserted that Tripoli must belong to Italy.¹

Nor was this group alone among the Italians of the Risorgimento who comprehended what must be the future trend of Italian policy in reference to Tripoli. In 1842 Cesare Balbo, statesman, diplomat and soldier, writing in the *Delle Speranze d'Italia*, a publication which was for a time the literary repository for Italian political ambitions, said, "Italy, as soon as she is independent, as soon as satisfaction shall be given for the needs which meanwhile must occupy her thoughts to the exclusion of all else, will have in turn to think of her need of expansion eastward and southward which all Christian people feel. Then if Italy is able to admit herself well of her part as second power in the work of independence she will be called upon to play the part in the work of expansion. Whether it be Tunis or Tripoli or any part of the Eastern continent matters not."²

With the attainment of her unity the alpha and omega of Italian foreign policy became directed to expansion in Africa and especially in Tripoli. That Italy was for the decades after her unification incapable of accomplishing her African ambitions was due to a combin-

¹ Gibbon's *New Map of Europe*, p. 241.

² Wallace, *Greater Italy*.

ation of political and economic forces. That period was filled with serious internal problems for the new state. Politically and economically Italy was unorganized; and the problems of organization were of necessity her first concern. When finally Italy did turn to the construction of a colonial empire it was for the time being to East Africa where the possibilities of opposition seemed less than along the North African littoral. The disaster of Adowa with its accompanying disgrace and discredit gave an abrupt pause to Italian efforts in that field. However the effects of the defeat at Adowa did not stop with the limitation of Italian plans in East Africa, but influenced the Italians deeply with regard to all colonial schemes, and tended to create a pessimistic attitude of future colonial ventures. At the same time it created a desire among a few, at least, notably in military circles, to eradicate the blot of Adowa by a successful penetration of North Africa.

Again during this period a group of pacifist socialists came into control of the government. Internationalism was advocated as the order of the day. Nationalism and colonial ventures were frowned upon, and attempts were made to discredit those who supported such ideas.

However with the advent of the twentieth century the international socialists began to lose ground rapidly. The reaction that now set in, carried the pendulum to the other extreme, strong nationalism. Once under way the nationalistic movement met with little resistance, since the control of the socialists had at best been uncertain and faltering. In fact by 1905 the nationalists were in complete control and were backed by the great majority of the people. At that time Italy found herself for the first time in her history prepared politically, economically and intellectually for expansion, and although

Italy had never before been in a position to make effective her colonial ambitions, those ambitions had remained alive and had steadily developed from the time of her unification. In 1871 while the seat of the government was yet at Florence, Italy made her first attempt to establish herself in North Africa. Trouble having arisen with the Bey of Tunis over the right of asylum, Italy broke off relations with the Bey and prepared to send a fleet to Tunis: and was only deterred from taking action by a protest from the French government, based upon the grounds that Italian military demonstrations at Tunis would encourage an Arab uprising which was taking on serious proportions in Algeria, and a curt note from the Porte stating that if Italy sent a fleet to Tunis it would be met at La Goulette by a Turkish squadron.¹

When France, in 1882 annexed Tunis, and removed that province from the sphere of possibilities, Italian colonial ambitions were further focused on Tripoli. Only four years later di Robilant, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, discussing the renewal of the Triple Alliance, requested assurances against French extension in North Africa, and specifically in the direction of Tripoli.² A year later, in 1887, an anonymous Italian writer who entitled himself "Ex-Diplomat" writing in the *Nuova Antologia* said, "No innovation in the Mediterranean and especially in Africa will be possible without our consent. We are therefore insured against the possibility of events such as occurred at Tunis, being repeated in Tripoli."³

Three years later Crispi, realising fully the importance of Trip-

¹ Barclay, Turco-Italian War and its Problems, 53.

² Fallace, Greater Italy, p.45.

³ Ibid.

oli to Italy, took steps to pave the way for Italian action in that direction. On July 25th 1890, he dispatched a note to Lord Salisbury requesting English sanction for the Italian schemes in Tripoli. Lord Salisbury replied with the following sagacious note, "The Italian Government will have Tripolitania but the huntsman to bring down the stag must wait until it comes within the range of his gun so that even wounded it will not escape."¹ While Crispi's attempts to secure English sanction for Italian schemes in Tripoli were thus turned aside by the cautious Englishman, his efforts in another direction were more fruitful; for in the same year he took steps to secure by various means the friendship of Hassuna, Pasha Karanikli, a man of great influence and the descendant of the old Pashaws of Tripoli.² That his efforts were entirely successful was proved forty years later when at the time of the Italian occupation of Tripoli, Hassuna Pasha was one of the Arab sheikhs who accepted the Italian allegiance, and was from the first to the last loyal to the Italians.³

Again in 1890, the Marchese Visconti Venosta, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of some agreements with France regarding Tunis, emphasized the position of Italy with reference to Tripoli, and pointed out definitely that Tripoli should eventually be compensation for the loss of Tunis.⁴ Nor was the Italian attitude toward Tripoli confined to the small group of statesmen who sat at the *so salta*; it was on the contrary shared by the masses of the Italian people. Their feelings on the matter were significantly demonstrated in 1899 when the ministry fell because of the alarm which spread through Italy upon hearing of the Anglo-French agreement of that year defining spheres of

¹ Wallace, *Greater Italy*, p. 115.

² *Ibid.*

³ Wallace, *Greater Italy*, p. 121.

⁴ *Ibid.*

influence in Africa and affecting the Tripolitan hinterland. The Marchese Visconti Venosta was recalled to the Foreign Office and was able to set in motion the negotiations which resulted in the Franco-Italian agreement of 1901. In that year the two countries reached a definite understanding regarding North Africa in a protocol whereby it was arranged that if France should ever extend a protectorate over Morocco, Italy should be compensated by Tripoli and Barca with the Fezzan as a hinterland. Italy's rights in Tripoli were to be recognized and should the status quo of North Africa be again disturbed France was to raise no objections to Italian occupation of Tripoli.¹ Although this protocol has never been published there is ample evidence of its existence. In December 1901, M. Delcasse, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, announced that France had no intentions of extending her influence beyond the limits set by the Anglo-French convention of 1894. A few days later in a statement to the French correspondent for the *Giornale d'Italia* he asserted that France and Italy had reached an agreement on the North African question.² In a still more definite statement to the Chamber of Deputies in 1902 he said, "In return for the assurance given by France not to interfere in Tripolitania, Italy has promised to do nothing which could obstruct French policy in Morocco."³

It is evident that England too at this time gave her consent to the Italian preemption of Tripolitania; for when questioned on the subject in 1902 in the Chamber of Deputies M. Prinetti, Minister for

¹ *Atlas of the World*, Map of Europe, p. 242.

² Barclay, *Turko-Italian War and Its Problems*, p. 55.

³ Wallace, *Greater Italy*, p. 116.

Foreign Affairs, replied that England had given assurances almost identical with those given by France.¹ It is indeed thought that it was probable that some of the other powers of Europe likewise gave sanction to the Italian rights in Tripoli at about the same time or shortly later; for in 1905 Signor Tittoni announced to the Italian Senate that the Powers had recognized Italy's preemption of Tripoli, but that so long as Italian interests were not disturbed there would be no actual occupation. In 1906, however, at the international conference of Algeciras Ital.'s rights in Tripoli were definitely recognized by the Powers.²

Italy now came to regard with jealous eye the least interference of either a foreign power or Turkey herself in Tripoli. In 1906 when the French sent a force to occupy the oasis of Belma the action sent a considerable stir through Italy. The *Giornale d'Italia* protested vigorously, declaring that the French were acquiring all the traffic routes from the interior into Tripoli. In 1908 just before the Young Turk revolution Italy and Turkey had a quarrel over the rights of Italians in Tripoli. Turkey was forced to concede every point, but at that time the Italians went so far as to make naval demonstrations. Again in 1910 Italy even protested when the Turkish Government sent troops to Tripoli.

So things stood when the Moroccan affair, in 1911, disrupted the North African status quo. Italy had established her claims on Tripoli and had secured them by agreements with the Powers of Europe. Tripoli had been officially recognized as the terra promessa of Italy. With England and France at least, definite understandings existed and as

¹ Wallace, Greater Italy, p. 117.
² Gibbons Ho Map of Europe, p. 242.

above noted the Powers had recognized Italy's rights at Algeciras. And to the Italians there was no doubt but that Tripoli belonged to them by the right of history, compensation and necessity.

During the same years that Italian statesmen were establishing the rights of Italy in Tripoli by means of diplomacy, a movement of equal importance was being carried on by the Italians in Tripoli itself, the economic penetration of the country. This process of peaceful or economic penetration was begun shortly after the disaster of Adowa, and might, if it had been allowed to go on unchecked, have won Tripoli for Italy without a blow. The policy was inaugurated on a vast scale in 1900, and was carefully fostered down to 1911. The first important step was the establishment of the Banco di Roma, an institution corresponding to the Russo-Chinese bank in Manchuria or the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas in Morocco.¹ The Banco di Roma was originally capitalized at \$4,000,000, which was later increased to \$6,000,000. It immediately began immense financial ventures in the vilayet. Industrial schemes of any sort which were suitable to the country were undertaken. Corn mills were established. An Es-parto Grass mill was purchased and put into operation, the largest establishment of its kind in Tripoli. The Banco was part proprietor of an oil and soap factory. It bought and operated a sponge factory from which it literally flooded the market with sponges. An ice factory was started but owing to the slight demand for ice was not successful. Electric light works were established. A heavily subsidized steam ship line began to make Tripoli, Derna and Benghazi ports of call. An immense flour mill was built at Benghazi. The Italian parcel post system, one of the most efficient in Europe was

¹ Mc Cullagh, Italy's War for a Desert, p. 14.

extended to the interior and the ostrich feather trade, was diverted into Italian channels.¹ Interior railroads and banking systems were contemplated.² Practically all of the reclaimable land in Tripoli was bought up by the Banco. Every effort was made to control the resources, industrial and agricultural of the province.

That all this was done under the secret auspices of the Italian government there seems little doubt. The director of the Banco was Signor Pacelli, a man whose association with the government was well known. He had a large circle of friends among whom were many government officials, the most important being Baron Sonnino,³ whose journal, the "Giornale d'Italia", stoutly championed the Banco and all its ventures. Signor Tittoni's brother was the vice-president of the concern and several of the members of the government owned stock.⁴ Added to these were various other bits of evidence which pointed convincingly to a link between the Banco and the Italian government, such as, for instance, the concession of the right to issue postal orders to the Benghazi and Tripoli branches of the Banco. Moreover, it is highly improbable that a group of private capitalists would have permitted the notorious business dealings of the Banco. The greater part of its ventures were carried on in such a manner that they resulted in financial losses, the total losses aggregating several million.⁵ Its oil and soap factory was the only speculation in which it indulged which was a marked financial success, and that was probably due to the efforts of the partner in the concern, Signor

¹ Giacobbe's Map of Europe, p. 244

² Ibid.

³ Wallace, Greater Italy, p. 15.

⁴ Ibid. p. 16.

⁵ McCullough, Italy's Work for a Desert, p. 16

Baldari. The Benghazi flour mill was the most unfortunate venture that the Banco participated in. The mill was erected at the cost of 1,000,000 lire. When finished and in operation it was found that there were only four or five sacks of flour to be ground per day. The agricultural ventures of the Banco were so miserably mismanaged that they disgusted even the Italian government. Vast tracts of land were bought up at the rate of ten lire per acre and sold for two. Conditions eventually reached such a state that the government sent an inspector to examine the books of the banks. The local director, however, was able to stay off the investigation, and the war coming a few weeks later prevented a further investigation. During the war all of the important war contracts were let to the Banco in spite of the lower bids from other contractors.¹

These operations, which could not for long escape the notice of the Turkish government, were winked at by the officials of Abdul Hamid, their consciences being quieted by Italian gold. With the passing of the old regime and the advent of the Young Turks this laxity changed. The ardent and misguided members of the new government threw every possible hindrance in the way of the Italian projects in Tripoli. The Italian Consul-General was repeatedly insulted. Italian citizens in Tripoli were subjected to every possible indignity, though we may not believe the exaggerated stories recited by the Italians who wished to make the case as bad as possible. The Young Turks took direct steps to curb the rising power of the Banco di Roma. Every new Vali of Tripoli was carefully instructed to hinder the activities of the Banco in every way possible. Monopolies were refused and its

¹ McCullagh, Italy's War for a Desert, p. 10.

business ventures were systematically obstructed. The last straw was when the Porte granted to Germany certain important railroad concessions which had been refused the Italians.

These operations, the policy of obstruction pursued by the Young Turks, had their repercussion in Italy and aroused much indignation. The Italians saw their cherished dreams being thwarted, and their citizens insulted by the Young Turks. They saw plainly that if allowed to continue their policy of opposition in Tripoli the Young Turks would soon destroy the economic hold that Italy had acquired there. This change in Turkish attitude, then, and realization by the Italians of what it would result in for their schemes if allowed to continue, prepared them for more drastic action.

It was indeed one of the immediate occasions of the Libyan war. There were others however of equal or greater importance, among which the disruption of the North African status quo at Agadir was foremost. Since the Franco-Italian and Anglo-Italian agreements of 1901 Morocco and Tripoli had been inseparably linked in the minds of the Italians. It will be remembered that according to the terms of these agreements Italy was to be allowed to occupy Tripoli if France should ever take similar action in Morocco. As long as France had refrained from taking such action Italy had been content with her policy of economic penetration by which means she was securing a powerful hold on the country. Now, however, the Young Turks were threatening that economic domination, and Italy no longer felt safe in trusting to that alone to maintain her hold upon Tripoli. The Moroccan affair, bringing into operation the agreement with France and England, opened the way for more aggressive measures.

In another and perhaps more indirect way, the crisis of Agadir

precipitated Italy's descent upon Tripoli. For some time past Italy had suspected her ally, Germany, of ambitions in Tripoli. The Germans had recently established a banking system in Tripoli, which, through the aid given by the Young Turks, had acquired an influence even the Banco di Roma. German steamships were running the Tripolitan coast towns ports of call, and a great deal of interest seemed to be centered in Tobruk. Naturally these operations were very distasteful to the Italians as it was feared that Germany, basing in the favor of the Turks, might get control of Tripoli. When Kaiser-Waechter then, precipitated the crisis which admiral and Germany became involved in a controversy with France and England, Italy welcomed the opportunity to make good her claims on Tripoli while the hands of her ally were tied by the Morocco affair.

The action of Austria in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 also had its influence on her action toward Tripoli. Austria's action had demonstrated the rottenness and helplessness of Turkey. That Austria had done in bold defiance of the international covenant of Berlin and the sovereignty of the Turkish Empire, Italy felt justified in duplicating in regard to Tripoli.

This combination of elements, the disruption of the North African status quo at Agadir, the growing fear of German activities in Tripoli, and the effect of the Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamic movements on Italian interests in that province determined the Italians to proceed to the actual occupation of Tripoli.

Chapter II

The War

Rumblings of the approaching trouble began to be heard as early as July 1911. On July 29 Italy notified her ambassadors that unless Turkey altered her attitude respecting Italian interests in Tripoli war would be declared. Turkey made no attempt to change conditions. On the contrary an anti-Italian demonstration took place at Constantinople on September 22. Therefore on September 26 Italy dispatched an ultimatum to Turkey stating her grievances (which were in the main the antagonistic measures taken by the Porte toward Italian interests in Tripoli and the treatment of Italian citizens there), and informing the Turkish government that unless Turkey immediately withdrew from the province of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and offered redress for the wrongs done to Italy, war would be declared and the provinces forcibly occupied. The conciliatory answer of the Porte being deemed unsatisfactory, war was declared on September 29, 1911.¹ On the same afternoon three Turkish torpedo boats were sent off Preveza on the Egean coast.

It is safe to say that seldom in the history of the world has war come so unexpectedly.² On September 26 the world at large received its first hint that there were serious difficulties between Turkey and Italy. Before it had time to learn even what those grievances were, Italian warships were sinking Turkish torpedo boats and begin-

¹ International Year Book, 1911, p. 708.

² Barclay, *Turko Italian War and its Problems*, p. 21.

ning their descent upon Tripoli.¹ Germany and Austria were as much in the dark as the rest of the world and their surprise was evinced by the storm of invective that came from their presses at the start.² On September 24th two divisions of the Italian fleet appeared off Tripoli. The Vali, realizing the futility of resistance, ordered the evacuation of the town, and with the main part of his forces withdrew into the desert. On October 4th the fleet bombarded the town and a naval brigade was landed. On October 11th the main body of the troops arrived and were landed without mishap. Civil administration was at once provided by the appointment of a vice-governor and a mayor.³ The two other important coast towns, Benghazi and Derna, fell before the end of the month, Derna on the 8th and Benghazi on the 19th.

The first serious resistance to the Italians came on October 25th in an attack which lasted until the 26th and came near resulting in disaster for the Italians. On the 25th the Arabs and the Turks in the desert in front of the Italian line attacked the Italians in force. Simultaneously the Arabs of the oasis, a series of gardens immediately behind the Italian lines, who had been armed by the Turks with rifles from Derna before they evacuated the town, rose and set upon the Italians from the rear. For a time the Italian center was in disorder, the troops confused by mists of the morning thought the Turks had broken through the lines and were in their rear. Had the Turks been able to attack in greater force at the time that the Arabs of the oasis rose, it is probable that the Italians would have been seriously defeated. The Italians have been accused of unnecessary slaughter in clearing the oasis, and of brutality amounting to atrocities. The

¹ Barclay, *War in Italy and its Problems*, p. 21.

² Ibid.

³ Kept, *Italians at Tripoli*, Living Age, Vol. 271, p. 799.

facts of the case however seem to be that the Italians, confronted with treachery and a situation which imperiled the entire Italian army, took the only effective steps to insure their own safety. That some barbarous acts were committed is doubtless true but frenzied as they were by the sudden attack in their rear, the Italians could hardly have been expected to deal gently with the treacherous Arabs.

Meanwhile conditions in Turkey were in chaos. The Grand Vicer Hakkı Pasha, had up to the very last minute refused to believe that Italy intended to attack Turkey.¹ Only a few weeks prior to the outbreak of hostilities he had withdrawn troops from Tripoli to send into the Yemen to quell a revolt there, and when criticised by Shevket Pasha, Minister of War, had laughed away his fears of Italy's intention to attack Turkey. As a result of his blindness the sudden outbreak of the war discredited him and his government. The ranks of the opposition swelled and their outcries became an uproar. Hakkı Pasha resigned, and upon the advice of the Committee of Union and Progress, the Sultan called Said Pasha to form a new cabinet.²

However as usual in times of crisis the government was paralyzed and hopelessly lost in a maze of cross purposes.³ The entire state seemed for a time to be on the verge of disruption.⁴ Toward the end of the year however the government became more stable, and was able throughout the rest of the war to offer at least a passive resistance to the Italian occupation. Enver Bey was recalled from Berlin where he had been serving as Military Attache and sent to Tripoli to take

1 Gibbons, New Map of Europe, p. 247.

2 Ibid.

3 Dillon, New Times, New Ideas, Contemporary Review, Vol. 100, p. 720

4 Ibid.

charge of the Turkish and Arab forces there. Throughout he proved himself an able general and a good organizer, in spite of the meager means that he had to work with. For in all there were not more than five thousand Turkish troops in Tripoli. They were however armed with modern field artillery.

However, the Turks had the considerable advantage of the almost solid support of the Arabs of the country. They were implacable in their opposition to the Italians throughout the war. Their extreme attitude was principally due to the activities of the con-fraternité of the Senussi, the strongest Mohammedan sect in Africa. The very heart of the con-fraternité was in Tripoli, and its principal forces were Jerabub, Barku, and Muhr. From the beginning of the war this powerful sect held the table lands of Cyrenaica and were the leaders of the resistance to the Italian everywhere. Inspired as they were by religious fanaticism they were untiring in their efforts to oppose Italian projects, and to rouse the masses of the Tripolitan Arabs to active resistance. They held the hinterland and all of the fortified citadels of the interior.¹ They were so powerful that the Italians never completely pacified them. In 1915 when Italy became embroiled in the European War, they rose again in open revolt² and are at the present time unpacified.

After the engagement of the 23rd, 26th and 27th an interval of quiet ensued. The Italians were able to drive the Turks and Arabs beyond the lines and to clear the ground immediately in front of the city. On November 6th the Italian parliament sanctioned a Royal Decree annexing the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and constituting

¹ White, Senussi and Military Issues in Tripoli, Nineteenth Century Vol. 71, p. 1216.

² Ibid, p. 1212.

them as the Italian province of Libya. This was indeed a drastic measure and apparently in violation of international law. Aside from the ethics of the case it has been seriously questioned whether it was to the advantage of Italy to take such a step. Having once annexed Tripolitania no compromise was possible. The war was then and there destined to be fought to a definite conclusion and any mediation or arbitration tending to adjust the claims of Italy was barred.

The Italians occupied the last months in 1911 in clearing up the coast and taking possession of the country lying immediately back of it. The interior however remained unconquered and fighting continued there throughout the last months of 1911, and the spring and summer of 1912. Enver Bey leading the Turks and Arabs kept up a harrowing warfare which sapped the strength and grinded the nerves of the Italians. On November 27th and on March 3rd attempts were made to take Berna, both of which failed. Between November 28th and March 12th attempts were made to retake Barghazi, all resulting in more or less disastrous defeat for the Arabs and Turks.¹

As time passed and the war dragged, the Italian public became restless.² The army in Tripoli was settled down to a slow, methodical penetration of the interior, which was proving costly, in spite of the glowing reports of the Italian press correspondents, and not highly successful. An Italian army of sixty-one thousand men was being employed and the cost of the war was growing burdensome.³

¹ Gibbon's New Map of Europe, p. 25.

² Ibid, pp. 35-37.

³ International Year Book, 1911.

Indeed the war was becoming a stalemate. The Italians held the coast but were unable to conquer the interior. The original plan, which had contemplated the surrender of the vilayet as soon as the coast was occupied, had failed because of the stubborn resistance of the Arabs of the country. Unwilling to risk confining the war to Tripoli, the Italian government early in 1912 decided upon a change in policy; in brief to carry the war into Asiatic and European Turkey in defiance of the protests of her ally Austria.¹

On February 27th as a feeler an Italian fleet bombarded Beirut and sunk two Turkish ships in the roadstead. France, Russia and Great Britain expressed concern, but took no further action. On April 1st the Italian fleet bombarded Nicosia and Sed-el-Bar, at the mouth of the Dardanelles. The principal result of the action was the closure of the Dardanelles to the Turks. The straits remained closed for a month when they were reopened upon the continued protests of the nations. During the month of May the Italians took possession of the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean, cut a number of cables connecting European and Asiatic Turkey, and shelled a number of Hellenic ports. Her actions in the Dodecanese were far-reaching. For immediately upon occupation Italy announced that she would retain at least Rhodes, and that she would enter the government of the other islands materially.

The summer was marked by no events of particular importance. In Tripoli General Canova² was making hard fought advances into the interior. The bloodiest engagement was that fought at the oasis of Zamzur which was occupied only after a hard fight.

¹ Ropington, *op. cit.*, April 5, 1913.

² Canova was commander-in-chief of the Italians in Tripoli.



Turkey was now beginning to feel the financial pressure of the war. The ports of Chios, Mytilene, Smyrna and others had been fortified in anticipation of an Italian attack, and the cost of the work was considerable. A new strip of railroad had been laid, prolonging the Hedjaz line in the direction of Mecca. These and the normal expenses of war began to tell upon the miserable Turkish finances.

As the year wore on unrest began to seethe throughout the Empire. In September 1911 when the war began there was in progress the annual revolt in the Yemen, and a serious uprising among the Catholic tribes in Albania,¹ the Malisori and the Mirditor. Neither of these revolts had been thoroughly crushed.² The Albanian tribesmen had been forced to accept terms but whole sections of the country remained in open revolt.³ The Yemen too was only half pacified.

More serious than all however was the trouble which began to show its head in the Balkans in the early part of 1912. True to the prophecies of the Austrians the sound of cannon in the Aegean stirred foreboding echoes in the Balkans. The Macedonians, who had been quiet since 1908, began revolutionary agitation. Secret societies were formed, riots took place at Ishteb and elsewhere, and rumors of a Balkan league began to spread.⁴

The activities of the Italians in the Aegean and the rumblings in the Balkans induced the Turks to begin peace negotiations, and on July 12th envoys were sent to Ouchy to meet the Italians. The pour-

¹ Annual Register, 1911, pp. 560-565.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Annual Register, 1912, pp. 560-565.

parlers continued throughout the summer without result. Italy would take nothing less than the recognition of her annexation of Tripoli; and Turkey still hoping for European intervention refused to go to this limit.¹

Early in October, Italy began sending feelers to Turkey suggesting a settlement of the war upon an indemnity basis. Turkey however still refused to recognize the annexation of Tripoli. Events were precipitated by the growing unrest in the Balkans. On October 8th Montenegro declared war upon Turkey. Italy determined to force a peace before the storm broke, forwarded terms to the Porte, and stated at the time that unless the terms were accepted within five days the Italians would attack Turkey in Europe. Simultaneously the Italian fleet was ordered to prepare for action on the Aegean. The approaching Balkan storm combined with Italy's threat to carry the war into Turkey left Turkey no choice but to make peace. Therefore on October 15th the treaty of Lausanne was signed at Ouchy in Switzerland. The principal provisions of the treaty provided that Turkey should grant complete autonomy to Tripoli, the Sultan, resigning in effect of temporal sovereignty. He was permitted to maintain his position as the head of the Mohammedan religion in Tripoli. Italy was to continue its occupation of the Dodecanese islands until Turkish resistance to Italian occupation in Tripoli had ceased. By this rather ambiguous arrangement Turkey was not required to recognize formally the Italian conquest of Tripoli, and was able to save a remnant of her honor.² The treaty of Lausanne concluded the Turco-Italian war, a war which in

¹ Annual Register, 1912, p. 362.

² Wallace, Greater Italy, p. 133.

many respects had never been a war and yet which had in effect given rise to the chain of events which brought the nations of the world into the conflict of 1914-1919. Villari writing in the Fortnightly Review for November 1915 says, "Indirectly it (the Libyan war) changed the whole course of European history by its influence upon the affairs of the Near East", and in the light of later events that influence may be said to have extended to the entire world. Not too much emphasis can be placed upon the tremendous significance of the Libyan war and its effects upon the later trend of events, not only in precipitating the Balkan wars, but in severing the ties, practical and sentimental (if any, such ever existed) which held the Triple Alliance together. The war revealed to all, and most important of all to the Balkan states the weakness of the Turkish empire.¹ It began anew the disintegration of the decadent fabric of the Ottoman state, and opened the way for the Balkan states to emulate Italy in her policy of open aggrandizement.

The attitude of the nations of Europe toward the war was almost solidly antagonistic. The press of Europe stormed Italy with invective during the early part of the war. Only Russia maintained a friendly attitude toward Italy, an attitude which is easily understood when Russia's traditional hostility toward Turkey is taken into consideration.²

At the same time Russia's stand was neutral, and she had not heard the peace and safety of Europe. Three times M. Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in December 1911, in February 1912, and in July 1912, submitted to the Powers notes suggesting steps to stop the war.

¹ Lazen, Modern European History, p. 160.

² Villari, Italy after the Libyan War, Fortnightly Review, v. 100, 145.

However, the Powers were unable to accept the Russian proposals or to agree upon a similar course of action, and nothing was done.¹

France, during the early period of the war remained friendly toward Italy. The French regarded Italian occupation of Tripoli as the natural corollary of their establishment in Morocco. Since 1902 when the two countries signed the protocol defining their respective rights in North Africa the French had been accustomed to regard Tripoli as an Italian colony in the same way that they looked upon Morocco as a province that belonged to France. Hence when Italy took possession of Tripoli in 1901 the act occasioned none of the frenzied denunciations that emanated from the other European countries.² Only the indiscretion of the Italians in stopping Greek mail steamers in the latter part of 1911 broiled the two countries in difficulties which kept them apart when they might have drifted together.

The radical stand taken by the British on the war is inexplicable without comprehension of the obtuseness and inconsistencies of the British mind. Doubtless, too the British feared the substitution of the vigorous and energetic Italian power in Tripoli for the decadent sway of the Porte. Italy controlling the harbors of Tripoli might at some time come to be a dominating power in the Mediterranean and throw a barrier across the route to India, the heart and center of the British empire.³

The ethics of Italy's attack upon Turkey have been much criticised by writers of all nations. It has been characterized by a number of unpleasant names and incongruously enough, in most cases by men whose native lands have not been entirely clear of the stigma of similar

¹ Dillon, Russia's Persistent Efforts to Stop the War, Fortnightly

Review, Vol. 100, p. 443.

² Ibid.

³ Knell of Triple Alliance, Living Age, Vol. 271, p. 701.

acts. However, the opinion of the more stable minded and non-biased men seems to be that while unjustified from a purely ethical stand, "Italy acted in September 1911 from those imperative material considerations which compelled England herself to act in South Africa toward the close of 1899",¹ and in accord with the contemporary political standards and practices of nations.² Giolitti speaking at Turin in October 1911 gives a resume of Italy's actions and motives, and gives logical justification upon such grounds. He calls attention to the fact that Italy acted in 1911 no differently than England, Germany or Russia would have done in similar circumstances. And when the historian of another day, removed from the bias of the times, writes the story of the Libyan war it will be with these facts in mind and Italy will be judged thereby.³

¹ Snell of the Triple Alliance, *Living Age*, Vol. 21, p. 707.

² Giolitti's Speech at Turin, *Review of Reviews*, Vol. 4, pp. 97-98.

³ Barclay, *Turco-Italian War and its Problems*, p. 12.



Chapter III

The Passing of the Triple Alliance

While the Turco-Italian war had many far reaching effects, some of which its own note set the fuse to the world conflagration of 1914-1918, none were more significant than the tremendous bearing it had upon the interrelations of the nations of the Triple Alliance.

The Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy was upon the Italian side at least the product of the political atmosphere and international complications of the times, an alliance rather of expediency than of friendship or common interests. When Italy attained unification and began to take stock of position among the powers she found herself immature and isolated. To the central power Italy offered valuable possibilities as an ally. Bismarck and the statesmen of central Europe looking into the future found a fair dream in the vision of Italy and Austria controlling the Mediterranean and throwing a barrier across the path to India. With this as one of the ends in view Bismarck carefully manipulated international diplomacy to bring Italy into alliance with Germany and Austria. First France was encouraged to annex Tunis, and then Italy was assured that Tunis and the empire of the Mediterranean should be hers. And Italy under the influence of her past and the urge of her present necessities came to regard Tunis as her terra promissa. Then came the French annexation of the country in 1881 with its bitter disappointment and keen resentment. Italy felt that she had been deprived of that which was hers by the "right of history, geography and necessity".

The animosity occasioned by the act is well known. Indignation in Italy rose to such a pitch that the Cairoli cabinet was forced to resign on May 14, 1881. At Marseilles French troops returning from Tunis were hissed and there was rioting between the French and Italians. The wave of indignation that swept Italy made impossible for the time any alliance between France and Italy, and at the same time was the direct cause of Italy's connection with the Triple Alliance.

From the very first, however, there was considerable rancor between Italy and her enemy-ally Austria. The Central Powers treated Italy with scant respect at times and notes of discord were not unsounded even in the early days of the Alliance. Indeed when the time came for the first renewal of the Alliance, public opinion in Italy was solidly against its continuation. In 1886 Count di Robilant, Minister of Foreign Affairs, writing the Italian ambassador in Berlin said, "Decidedly Italy is tired of this sterile alliance, and I do not feel desirous of forcing her to renew it because I feel too deeply that it will always be unproductive for us. It is probable that M. de Bismarck has made a mistake regarding me, not knowing me at all and imagines that I will follow his lead always and in spite of everything. If he thought that he is mistaken. It is therefore more than probable that I will not renew the alliance". That Italy did renew the Alliance in 1886 was due to the temporary eclipse of Italian prestige by the defeat at Dogali and the fear of isolation since she was still on unfriendly terms with France.

During the second decade of the Alliance Bismarck, staunch friend of Germany, welded the Alliance solid for the time being. He drew the strings together, thrusting into the shadow the difficulties between Italy and Austria, and magnifying the political value of the

liance to Italy; and at the same time he pushed France still farther away. Then came the disaster of Adowa, and with it Crispi's ruin, and the sudden eclipse of his political policies. With Crispi's passing passed also the palmy days of the Triple Alliance.

The first decade of the twentieth century abounds in the exchange of grievances between Austria and Italy. With no strong supporter of the Triple Alliance in power, difficulties, following the natural course of events, multiplied. The raison d'être of the Triple Alliance was waning, and the unique situation of the natural enemies, Austria and Italy, alike, began to bear fruit. Notable among the events manifesting the dissonance within the alliance was the sharp protest from Austria when the Tsar visited Italy in 1907.¹

The probable future rupture in the Triple Alliance was now foreseen by both Italy and Austria; and both began and carried through preparations along their borders.² A number of roads were built and frontiers strengthened. For example during the years 1905-6 Italy built railroads to the lines of defense behind the Alpi and Brenta rivers. The lines of the Adige, the Asic and Liave were strengthened, and roads built behind them.

Austria too carried through a number of important fortifications on the Italian frontier. "From Krentzberg to Switzerland the lines were fortified and put in order".³ Frequent military maneuvers were held along the borders and were discussed freely by the press of Europe.⁴

¹ Wallace, Greater Italy, p. 107.

² Repington, Austria and Italy, Living Age, Vol. 266, p. 527.

³ Ibid. p. 531.

⁴ Ibid. p. 537.

Nor did the rapprochement between France and Italy in 1901 tend to inspire Germany and Austria with confidence in their ally, and when at the Conference of Algiers in accordance with that agreement the Italian delegate voted with the French and English, they were further irritated. Italy was accused of infidelity to the Triple Alliance and a number of diplomatic visits were necessary before the affair was finally laid to rest.¹

Again in 1908 the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an action taken without the knowledge or consent of Italy, and one which indubitably disturbed the Balkan situation and for that reason was in violation of Article Seven of the Triple Alliance Treaty, roused deep indignation in Italy. The Austrian Embassy was assaulted, its windows broken and popular censure expressed in the Chamber. And yet Austria and Italy were allies.

These differences and numerous others of a similar nature accumulating through the years had sown the seeds of decay within the Triple Alliance. Then came the Libyan war, at the apogee of the summarized grievances of three decades, and adding to them a host of new and yet more vital troubles. It was the final straw.

When Italy embarked upon the conquest of Tripoli in September 1911 she naturally expected sympathy or at least a benevolent neutrality from her allies, Germany and Austria.² What actually happened was

¹ Wallace, *Greater Italy*, p. 103.

² *Time History*, Vol 5, p. 9.

the exact reverse of this. Instead of sympathy her fiercest criticism came from those countries, a fact which threw her unnatural alliance with the Central Powers in a lurid light. The war throughout its entire course, from the dispatch of the ultimatum to Turkey to the peace of Lausanne, was the course of continual irritation within the Triple Alliance, and stirred deeper feelings of resentment which were not to be affected by diplomatic visits or fine phrases.

Events in connection with the war which made impossible in the future any real union between the members of the Triple Alliance may be roughly grouped in three categories; (1) Austro-Italian relations during the war, with major emphasis upon the attempts of Austria to limit the Italian sphere of operations; (2) German-Italian relations during the war, in particular the effects of the war upon the German policies in the Near East, and the German reactions thereto; (3) the change in Italy's political situation resulting from the war, and the incompatibility between her aspirations and her position as ally of Germany and Austro-Hungary.

From the beginning Austria manifested in a number of ways an antagonism toward Italy's attack upon Turkey. This, in part, her attitude was due to a sincere apprehension lest the war would lead to a Balkan eruption and a general war we may not doubt. But whatever her motives, her attitude produced a decided dudgion in Italy. Her persistent efforts to limit the sphere of operations to the African theatre, despite the turn that affairs took for Italy, left the Italians with a very poor taste for their allies.

At the beginning Austria placed sharp limitations upon the area of the war, demanding that Italy restrict it to Tripoli and that no

action be taken which might endanger the status quo in the Balkans.¹ On September 26 1911 Count Aehrenthal, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, immediately upon being informed of Italy's contemplated action toward Turkey, instructed Baron Ambrosy, Austrian Ambassador to Rome, that the Marchese di San Giuliano had in a previous conversation with him intimated that should Italy and Turkey go to war over Tripoli operations should be limited to the Mediterranean coasts of Africa and that Austria would hold Italy to this agreement.² Early in October Baron Gautschi, speaking in the Austrian chamber dwelt at length upon the importance to Austria of the limitation of hostilities. He said, "It is self evident that in view of its great interest in the Adriatic and adjacent Balkan countries the Austro-Hungarian state is bound to attach main importance to the limitation of the theater of hostilities.³ Later speaking of Italy he asserted that Italy had covenanted to exclude from military or naval operations the Turkish coast of the Adriatic and Ionian seas. He ended his speech with the significant remark that Austria-Hungary would adopt whatever measures may be necessary to protect Austro-Hungarian commercial interests should they appear to be menaced by the present situation.⁴

That Italy however formally admitted the Austrian right to demand a restriction on operations, or that she ever agreed definitely to limit them is denied by the Italians. For on October 21st upon the further demands of the Austrian foreign office that Italy agree to

¹ Dillon, *New Times*, New Cases, Contemporary Review, Vol. 101, p. 720

² Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Appendix No. 3, Scott Edition, 2, pp. 537-8.

³ London Times, April 25th 1911, 5a.

⁴ Ibid.



confine to war to the African littoral and interior, Von Murey, Austrian Ambassador at Rome, sent to Count Lehrenthal the following message, "We have just received the following reply from the Foreign Minister to my latest representation, "We have always reserved our freedom of military operations outside of the Turkish coast in the Adriatic and Ionian seas. We should be delighted if we should not be compelled to take advantage of that freedom, but nevertheless we receive it in its entirety."¹ There already was a striking illustration of the spirit in which the Austrian attempts to regulate the war were accepted, a spirit out of which it was inevitable that there should arise still greater friction between the allies. The friction did continue and as the war progressed the diplomatic controversy over the right to extend operations warmed hotter and hotter.

In a letter of instruction to Von Murey on November 6th Count Lehrenthal described an interview between the Duke of Avarna and himself, upon the subject of war operations in the Aegean, where it had been reported that Italian warships were cruising off Salonika. The Duke emphatically denied the report. Count Lehrenthal pointed out that owing to the unrest in the Balkans any military operations in or about the peninsula were likely to result in the disruption of the Balkan status quo guaranteed under Article Seven of the Triple Alliance Treaty.² The Duke of Avarna then asked whether the occupation of some of the Aegean islands would be in violation of the treaty. Count Lehrenthal assured him that any such action would be regarded so by Austria.³ The next day, fearing that the Italians

¹ Austrian Red Book Vol. 2, Appendix 4, Scott Edition, Vol. 2, p. 359

² See below Appendix 1.

³ Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Appendix 4, Scott Edition, Vol. 2, p. 359



contemplated the bombardment of ports in European Turkey, Count Aehrenthal informed the Italian ambassador officially that the bombardment of any of the Turkish ports would be in violation of Article Seven of the Triple Alliance Treaty.¹

On November 15th Count Aehrenthal again wiring instructions to Von Meroy describes another interview between the Duke of Avarna and himself, occasioned by the reception of a telegram from the Marchese di San Giuliano suggesting the extension of operations to the Aegean. Count Aehrenthal took a decided stand, refusing to discuss the matter further, and saying that to do so would be to accept a portion of Italy's responsibility should she take such action.²

Throughout the remainder of 1911 the controversy between the Austrian and Italian foreign offices continued growing more bitter as Italy became more and more involved in the war. Time and again the Italian ambassador approached Count Aehrenthal upon the subject of the extension of hostilities, and each time was met with the same unequivocal attitude. Italy now determined to appeal to her other ally, Germany, hoping to find in her a friend whose influence might be used to shake the position of Austria. However once again her efforts were met and blocked by Austria. On November 23rd Count Aehrenthal becoming cognizant of Italy's intention sent instruction to Count Szogyeny, Austrian Ambassador to Germany, expressing himself as strongly opposed to Italy's purpose, intimating of course that the Count should use his influence against it in Berlin.³

¹ Times Histor., Vol. 5 p. 10.

² Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Appendix No 6, Scott Edition, Vol. 2, 340

³ Ibid, 341.

Meantime the war dragged and Italy chafed under restraint. The prolongation of operations in Tripoli set up a violent desire in Italy for extension of hostilities along the Turkish coast and in Albania.¹ At the time of Italy's descent upon Tripoli the Italians did not realize the results of the war upon Italy if prolonged. Such a contingency had not been considered likely. They had expected the Turks to acquiesce after a brief display of force, negotiations to ensue and the Bosnia Herzegovina fiasco to be duplicated with Tripoltania and Cyrenaica as its subjects.² The entire affair would be concluded in a few weeks or months at the most. By the beginning of 1912 Italy had been economically prosperous. Her finances were orderly; the rent was above par; the lira was higher than usual; public credit was good and the country was generally in easy circumstances.³

The continuation of the war reversed all this. The lira depreciated in value. The market was flooded with securities. Prices fell over the entire country and general economic depression set in. The Turkish empire had been the principal mart for Italian goods, and a prohibitive duty placed on goods destined for any part of Turkey crippled Italian industry and threw thousands of Italian laborers out of work.⁴ The country was thronged with unemployed, many in actual destitution. Commerce was seriously impaired and the seaport towns were filled with the unemployed who had been left idle by the stagnation of commerce. Added to these were the hordes of Italian refugees expelled from Turkey by Enlalt Bey. Homeless and succorless and

¹ Annual Register, 1911.

² Dillon, War is Coming to an End, Contemporary Review, v. 102, p. 117.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Legi, Italians at Tripoli, Living Age, vol. 271, p. 795.

and suffering they thronged the seaports, or wandered over the country gaining subsistence by such means as they might.¹

The actual cost of the war was becoming burdensome, having mounted to the sum 1,500,000 per day.² By May 1st the total cost reached 252,000,000 lire with prospects of increasing expense. A further fact to be considered was the deterioration in war materials, such as artillery, field equipment, etc. Practically the entire Italian navy had been in the water for several months and needed dry dock badly.³

The stress of these conditions, the general disorder, economic depression, and the sombre prospects for the future weighed the moral of the nation. Discontent was rife everywhere and among all classes. There was an evergrowing sentiment for the conclusion of the war and for taking whatever steps were necessary to that end. And yet Austria, Italy's ally, said "no" to the only effective means that Italy had for bringing Turkey to terms. It was a matter of life and death to many of the Italian people that Italy should carry operations into theatres where Turkey could be made to feel the pressure of the war, and to cede Tripolitana and Cyrenaica (since Italy's action in annexing these provinces had precluded any other settlement consistent with her honor.) This condition of affairs inflamed public opinion in Italy and influenced even those who for one reason or another had been favorable inclined toward the Triple Alliance.

During the first months of 1912 the pressure from within became so great that the Italian government, determined to extend military and naval operations in spite of the protests of Austria. In February the bombardment of Beirut occasioned a warning protest from Vienna,

¹ Dillon, War is Coming to an End, Contemporary Review, vol. 2, p. 117

² Wallace, Greater Italy, p. 128

³ Ibid.

and during the following months as Italy proceeded to carry the war home to Turkey in open defiance of Austria, the two countries were not far from actual war. The closure of the Dardanelles occasioned by the Italian bombardment Kum Kale and Sed-el-Bar in April, caused a considerable tremor throughout all of Europe and a series of protests from Austria to Italy. It was at this juncture that the Austrians went so far as to threaten Italy with the actual abrogation of the Triple Alliance. On that occasion Count Berchtold informed the Duke of Avarna in plain terms that "if the Royal Italian Government desired to recover its liberty of action the Imperial and Royal Government could do the same", but he (Berchtold) could not admit that we should in the future undertake similar operations or any action whatever that should be opposed to the point of view manifested in the preceding conferences. Should any such operation be undertaken by us it might be attended by grave consequences.¹

The occupation of the Dodecanese during the 1st week of April and May was the occasion of further heated controversy. Count Berchtold in a letter of instructions to Von Meray wrote, "The question of occupation of islands in the Aegean has repeatedly been the subject of conversation between me and the Italian Ambassador in the last few days". He continues saying that Austria was and ever would be thoroughly opposed. The Duke of Avarna replied that he was very apprehensive lest the antagonistic attitude taken by Austria should arouse bitter resentment in Italy. He explained that it impressed Italy strangely to see of all Europe including Germany, that it was Austria-Hungary, Italy's ally, who caused Italy greatest difficulty

¹ Italian Green Book No. 3, Scott Edition, pp. 1218-16.

in the attainment of her aim. Count Berchtold replied that Austria was in a difficult position and that in the opinion of the Austrians the occupations in question (of the Dodecanese) was contrary to Article Seven of the Triple Alliance treaty, which gives to Austria the right to demand compensation. For a time Austria would make no such demands but would hold the right in reserve. Count Berchtold expressed himself as very doubtful regarding the result of the occupation of the islands, and pointed out that Austria had been exposed to such action from the beginning and for whatever consequences ensued Italy would be entirely responsible.¹ Thus Austria steadily refused Italy's right to attack further on the mainland or in the Aegean.

Later in April 1912 when the Danger of War had again approached Count Berchtold in an effort to procure Austria's consent to further attack upon Turkey he was flatly refused. During the following summer months the subject was discussed by the Foreign Offices of the two countries but always with the same results, Austria stubbornly adhering to the opposition.²

Germany realized the danger in the situation and made attempts at conciliation. The Emperor paid a visit to the King at Venice but owing to his position as an ally of Italy and the protector of Austria he could accomplish very little. After the Emperor's visit Kaiser's wife accompanied to Rome where he conferred with Giolitti, the Marchese di San Giuliano and Victor Emmanuel but he too was bound by Germany's political situation.³ But it is not born for Germany's

¹ Austrian Red Book, No. 2 Appendix 13, Sept. Edition, Vol. 12, p. 345.

² Austrian Red Book and Italian Green Book.

³ Annual Register 1912, pp. 309-311.

singular position with reference to Turkey and Italy it is not doubted whether the efforts of the Emperor or Kiderlen-Tseolner would have availed to smooth the differences between Austria and Italy, differences which had aroused such animosity among the Italian people.

The action taken by the Austrians at first in attempting to limit war operations in spite of the drastic demand of Italy, roused feeling enough, but this irritation was further strengthened by the attitude of the Austrian people in general. The Austrian press was almost solidly antagonistic, and showed even a leaning toward Turkey. A summary of the press accounts including those of Hans Frey Frey and other prominent journals showed very little sympathy for the ally Italy, and a rather friendly attitude toward Turkey. For example the fight at the oasis on September 25th-26th, where the Italians stood their ground against such heavy odds, is characterized as an "Italian retreat" and as an "Italian mishap". Misleading and malicious remarks upon the position of the Italians in Tripoli were frequent, and their successes were described (if at all) as of little importance.¹ The Reichspost went so far as to criticize Count Aehrenthal for taking too friendly an attitude toward Italy, and called for a firmer, more aggressive policy directed against Italy, who was disturbing Austrian interests in the Mediterranean. He (Count Aehrenthal) was severely rated for not more closely guarding those Austrian interests in the Balkans, and for allowing Austro-Hungarian consulates to take charge of Italian interests in the Turkish empire.² These remarks were characteristic of the general manner of hostility of the Austrian

¹ London Times, October 5th, 1911, 10c.

² London Times, October 13th, 1911, 10c.

press.¹

Many of the Austrian officials took a very radical stand towards Italy. A strong anti-Italian party developed in Vienna which asserted in no unvarnished terms that the moment to strike Italy had come. This faction was led by the Austrian Chief of General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf. Considerable agitation was aroused by the party and it went so far as to have certain fortifications erected along the Italian border, its activities becoming so pronounced that the Government was compelled to ask Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf to resign, but at that time the damage had been done.²

Italy of course reacted strongly to what she regarded as Austria's unfriendly policies. These policies and the decided sentiments of the Austrian people could not fail to have their repercussion in Italy. As expressed by the Duke of Avarna to the Austrian Foreign Minister Italy saw in Austria her worst enemy. Her most vital policies were blocked and obstructed in every way possible by Austria; one of her hardest critics was Austria; and the entire Austrian nation seemed to be out of sympathy with Italy.

The effects of all this upon the Italian people were evinced in a number of ways. Irredentism flamed in Venetia and the Trentino.³ Austrian travelers were frequently attacked and violated. A particular instance took place at Udini where a mob set upon and seriously injured a number of Austrians.⁴ At Trieste, at Riva and around Lago di Garda anti-Austrian societies were formed and displayed openly

¹ Wallace, Greater Italy, p. 121.

² Ibid. p. 146.

³ Annual Register, 1912, pp. 500-510.

⁴ Ibid.

anti-Austrian feelings.¹

While the major rift in the Triple Alliance created by the Libyan war were those between Austria and Italy, the war occasioned conflicts of interest between Italy and Germany, which if less obvious were only second in importance, and combined with the Austro-Italian quarrels went far to strengthen the barrier between Italy and her allies.

The paramount difficulty between Germany and Italy was the effect which Italy's descent upon Tripoli had upon the carefully laid plans of the Germans in the Near East, and the reaction of the Turks towards Germany because of the war.

For years prior to 1911 Germany had been carefully weaving a web of diplomacy about the Turk. He had been assured that Germany was his best friend who would protect him in time of need, who would care for the solidarity of his moribund empire, and prevent foreign aggression.²

And it was upon these plans in the Near East that Germany had been reconstructing her foreign policy. For two decades prior to 1911 Germany had been doing an about face from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and her Constantinople, Morocco and Asiatic activities were expressions of this movement. As one phase of this movement Germany contemplated a Turco-Italian control of the Mediterranean, a vital blow to England commercially and colonially.³ For years the solidarity of the Turkish Triple Alliance combination, with this naval dom-

¹ Annual Register, 1912, pp. 509-516.

² Times History, vol. 5, p. 99.

³ Long, Germany's Mediterranean Scheme, Foreign Affairs Review, 90: 895.

ination of the Mediterranean as a whole, and a view, and a plan
industrial; fostered; Austria and Germany had been turned as a rival
power, and antagonism between Italy and Germany had been sharpened
away as possible.¹ At the same time, and as a closely allied policy,
insidious attempts had been made to divert Germany to include Russia,
and to convince Italy that the great rivalry between Germany and Eng-
land was sterile of material results.²

Under these circumstances Italy could have taken no step which
would have been more of a blow to Germany than the Italian invasion of
Libya. The war drove a coach and four through German
foreign policies, and she was crawling to-day for aid for Mediter-
ranean control. The network which had been so laboriously spun
about Turkey seemed to be well on the way to destruction, and German
ambitions were dealt a blow from which they could never recover. Her posi-
tion was indeed a most enhanced one, and she was now in a position
of power. Von Hindenburg-Wiechert as he tossed upon his crumpled pillow
marveling upon the course of the events. He thought that his frolic
at Agadir should have brought upon him the servitude of Germany's
ambitious policy. Indeed, Germany was placed in the very unpleasant
position of having to stand by while her ally, violated the integrity
of the Ottoman empire.

The Tripolitan affair following as it did fast after the Bosnian-
Herzegovina annexation, disillusioned Turkey and made her distrustful
of her good friend Germany, who in spite of her assurances of protect-
ing power and friendship has twice within the period of three years
stood quietly by while first one and then the other member of the

¹ Long, Germany's Mediterranean League, Fortnightly Review, 90: 875.

² Ibid. p. 887.

Triple Alliance cut off portions of the Ottoman state.¹ It was only in the natural course of events that Germany should feel genuine resentment toward her ally who seemed so reckless of German plans when they chance to conflict with her own ambitions.

The dissensions between Austria and Italy brought by the war threatened again Germany's international schemes. Her policy ever since the formation of the Triple Alliance had been to mitigate the differences between Austria and Italy, and her efforts had borne some fruits. Prior to the war the Austro-Italian rift had at least not grown out of bounds. However the war changed all this, and Germany more involved, closer to the inner workings of the Alliance perceived that the damage done between Italy and Austria was well nigh irreparable. Small wonder then that Germany felt that the collapse of her foreign policy could be directly attributed to the Prussian raid of her ally, Italy, that she had a good cause to be rightfully indignant towards Italy whose acts had brought shadows over her cherished schemes.

The war and its results brought to a head a sentiment that had been latent in Germany for some time, namely, the idea that after all Turkey would make a better ally than Italy. An Alliance with Turkey has ever appealed to German writers, and with the possibilities of a strong Turkish fleet the attraction grew apace.² Italy was and had always been recognized as the weak member of the Triple Alliance, and could be relied upon in a land war only, and not that should the enemy chance to be England. There was in some quarters a definite

¹ *Ibid.*, Germany's Mediterranean League, *Fortnightly Review*, 90: 889.

² *Ibid.*, 881, 887.

³ *Ibid.*, 889.

desire to replace Italy by Turkey in the Alliance. This sentiment was expressed by many writers and in some quarters by the press.¹

Naturally, such an attitude did not tend to decrease Germany's bitterness against Italy for her attack on Tripoli. Germany herself was beginning to develop commercial interests in Tripoli, and to secretly obstruct Italy's schemes there when possible,² and as demonstrated times without number in modern colonial history commercial interests are the prelude to the acquisition of a new colony. Germany at least expected to occupy Tobruk as a naval base, a fact which illuminates Italy's hasty seizure of the place at the beginning of the war, and had it not been that the Moroccan affair was still under debate it is probable that she would have taken some step to do so during the war.³

Finally Germany's foreign policy received a blow from yet another direction because of the Libyan war. Russia was roused from her inactivity and through the sympathy that she showed for Italy during the war was brought into better relations with her. Italy came to regard Russia more or less as a friend. She at least had displayed a much more friendly attitude throughout the war than either of Italy's allies.

During the war Germany's hostility was evinced in a number of ways. From the first Germany assisted the Turks with arms and ammunition. Enver Pasha came directly from Berlin to take charge of the operation in Tripoli, and continued to stir dissatisfaction in Tripoli long after the war was over.⁴ Von der Goltz Pasha, chief of the German Military Mission at Constantinople, exerted all of his power in de-

¹ Long, Germany's Mediterranean League, Fortnightly Review, 96: 889.

² Finck's history, Vol. 6, p. 3.

³ Dillon, New Times, New Cases, Contemporary Review, Vol. 100, p. 721.

⁴ Long, Italy in the War, p. 252.

fense of Tripoli, and gave his influence to the continuation of the struggle.¹

The German press was vindictive from the beginning, and was induced to modify its attitude only by prudence.² In the storm of invective emanating from the German press upon her declaration of war, Italy was accused of deceiving both of the partners to the Alliance, of imperiling and neglecting German interests at Constantinople and in Asia.

Such organs as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Lokal Anzeiger* denounce the Italian war as an "act of violence in times of peace against which all civilized Europe, quite apart from the question of political views and interests, must protest."³ Italy was accused of riding wantonly over the interests of her allies and subverting all else to her particular ambitions. The *Monatsschrift* *Die Welt* in an article fairly representative of the German press as a whole says, "Italy has violated the international rights of the people of Europe. She betrays one after another those who have been of service to her. She is never faithful to her agreements except it is to the advantage of her spirit of greed to keep her word. She is ready to fight today the friend of yesterday for the sake of very small advantages that may be gained thereby. Today when by universal consent she has been allowed to recover her national frontiers, by the power thus acquired she makes merchandise of herself, threatening to desert her close friends (Germany and Austria) and to deliver these governments into the hands

¹ Pallace, *Greater Italy*, p. 124.

² Long, *Germany's Mediterranean League*, *Foreign Affairs Review*, 95: 588.

³ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 30, 1911.

of their enemies unless she is permitted without interference to prosecute her ambitious designs. Italy was never called upon to invade Tripoli for the sake of forestalling such rivals as England or Germany. She had no need to break the circle of nations which might lock her up in the peninsula. It is evident that Italy was really agreed on in her African adventure by England, in order to set the allies of Germany by the ears at the critical moment of the Moroccan embroglio. Instead of confining the war to the area of Tripoli, Italy has fomented a rising in Albania and a revolt in Arabia".¹

After a time it is true that the tone of the German press moderated but not before much damage had been done, and when eventually it did abate it was because the government, perceiving the destructive effects upon the Triple Alliance relations, discouraged further adverse comment.²

The Libyan war changed in yet another respect the situation of Italy with reference to the Triple Alliance; for the acquisition of the new province of Libya created a new set of considerations which bore directly upon Italy's foreign policies, and when Italy became deeply involved in North Africa her position was, ipso facto, altered materially. The new province would require for some time a strong garrison, even under Italian control, a feat which has never been thoroughly accomplished. Economic and financial interests of increasing importance would be concentrated in Libya. Communications would per-

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Y., *Intel of the Triple Alliance*, Living Age, Vol. 271, p. 771

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Usher, *Crisis in the Mediterranean*, Forum, Vol. 48, p. 641.

force be by water, and the most vital interests, the very existence of the new colony must depend upon the friendly attitude of the powers that controlled the seas, France and England. With forty thousand men in Tripoli, with a large quantity of war material bound up there, with Italian capital and Italian industry involved, Italy could scarcely afford in case of war to lose all this; nor to lose the colony for which she had paid such a price. With these considerations looking at it was a matter of primary self-interest for Italy to cut off her moorings from the Triple Alliance (which in the event of war would render her little if an assistance in Libya) and at the first opportunity to shift to the side of the Triple Entente which controlled the Mediterranean and the vital line of communication between Italy and her newly acquired, semi-pacific colony.¹

Testimony to the alteration Italy's situation brought about by the war and its influence upon the interrelations of the Triple Alliance nations is found in a statement made by Sonnino in a dispatch to the Duke of Avarna during the discussions which preceded the formal abrogation of the Alliance in the spring of 1915. Baron Sonnino said, "I must point out that the geographic position of Italy in the Mediterranean forbids her showing any favor to one group of belligerents that might provoke reprisals on the part of the other who dominates the sea,"² unless she wished to jeopardize the whole of her economic existence."³ While Sonnino does not mention Libya in this dispatch it is quite probable that when he speaks of "reprisals" he has in mind Libya, and that when he mentions economic interests he refers, among

¹ Usher, Crisis in the Mediterranean, Forum, Vol. 48, p. 641

² Italian Green Book No. 56, Scot. Edition, Vol. 2, p. 1294.

³ The italics are my own.

other things, to those involved in Libya. Thus the war placed Italy in a position where she could no longer afford to maintain her place as a member of the Triple Alliance.

It was logical then, that when the Triple Alliance should be put to the actual test, the effects of the Libyan war upon the alliance should become apparent; and indeed the best evidence to be found anywhere of the destructive results, which the Libyan war had upon the Triple Alliance, is in the official document regarding the discussions which took place among the members of the Triple Alliance between the outbreak of the European War in 1914 and the formal repudiation of the Triple Alliance by Italy in May 1915. References to the attitude of the central powers and especially Austria constantly recur in these documents from the first to the last, and time after time the powers were reminded of the stand they took during the Libyan war in 1911 and 1912. In a remarkable frank and outspoken dispatch to the Duke of Sava on December 9th 1914, Baron Sonnino says, "To render our attitude effectively clear we must remind the Imperial and Royal Government that, basing the actions precisely upon what is set forth in Article Seven, it restricted us during our war with Turkey from carrying out several military operations which would have certainly shortened the duration of the war. The naval operations in the Dardanelles gave rise to formal revocations on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government".¹ Three days later, on December 12th, the Duke of Sava replying to Sonnino's dispatch describes the interview with Count Berchtold in which he presented the Italian representation. At the

¹ Italian Green Book, No. 1, Scott Edition, Vol. I, p. 1249.

time he had laid considerable emphasis on the opposition of the Imperial and Royal Government to our military and naval operations during the Italo-Turkish war".¹ In a dispatch to the Duke of Aviano on December 16th Baron Sonnino rehearses in brief the representations of the Austrian Government during the Libyan war, asserting that the Austrians attempted to hinder the Italians from even "simple military operations", and further that "the attitude of Austria-Hungary was the source of a very serious loss to us alike in a military and political sense, since it created the resistance of Turkey, which fell indirectly supported and protected". He (Sonnino) then quoted the exact terms used by that (the Austro-Hungarian) Government during the Libyan war" saying, "In your telegram of November 5th 1911, Your Excellency informed us that Count Achrenthal had declared to you that "action of ours on the Ottoman coast of Turkey in Europe or in the islands of the Aegean Sea could not be permitted either by Austria or Germany because of being opposed to the Triple Alliance". Such a declaration was made to your Excellency in consequence of a rumor current to the effect that Italian warships had made use of search lights in the neighborhood of Saloniki. In your telegram of the 7th November 1911 Your Excellency informed us that "Count Achrenthal considers the bombardment of ports in European Turkey such as Saloniki, and Cavalle, opposed to the provisions of the Seventh Article." In April 1912 Count Berchtold lodged strong protest because the Italian squadron before the Dardanelles had damaged the forts in replying to shots that

¹ Italian Green Book No. 2 Scott Edition, Vol. I, p. 1212.

were fired upon it from them; on that occasion declaring to you that "if the Royal Italian Government wished to recover its liberty of action the Imperial and Royal Government could do the same". But he could not admit that we should in the future undertake similar operations or any action whatever that should be opposed to the point of view manifested in the preceding conferences. Should any such action be undertaken by us it might be attended by grave consequences".¹

Finally late in May 1915 when the formal abrogation of the Triple Alliance was at hand in a circular note to the Italian representatives at foreign governments setting forth Italy's reasons for such action Baron Sonnino, speaking of Austrian hostility toward Italy, says, "Of the many instances which could be cited it is enough to say that in 1911 when Italy was engaged in war with Turkey, the Austro-ungarian General Staff prepared a campaign against us, and the military party prosecuted energetically a political intrigue designed to drag in other responsible elements of Austria; since that time we have been constantly under apprehension of a sudden attack whenever the party opposed to us had the other hand in Vienna".²

Clearly do these discussions echo the Libyan war. And indeed that war sharply outlined as the last mile post along the way of the Triple Alliance, the consummative factor in its destruction; for as is so luridly revealed by those discussions above noted, the attitude of her allies in 1911 and 1912 left Italy with a lasting hostile impression, alienated the sympathies of the Italian people, and gave a new trend to their political thought, in a word sounded the death knell of the Triple Alliance.

¹ Italian Green Book, No. 6, Scott Edition, Vol. I, pp. 1215-1216.

² Ibid, p. 1327.

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Appendix No. I.

Article Seven of the Triple Alliance Treaty provides that the status quo of the Balkans shall not be disrupted unless necessitated by the intrusion of a third party, for the appearance of conditions warranting the interference of Italy or Austria, in which event compensation must be made to the non-interfering nations.¹

Article Seven has been of great importance in the relations of the Triple Alliance Nation and about its interpretation a great many of the diplomatic discussions between Italy and Austria during the Italo-Turkish war and the Great War revolved. The Italian Green Book and the Second Austrian Red Book are filled with diplomatic representations which hinge upon Article Seven.

¹ Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Appendix No. I, Scott's Edition, Vol. II, pages 545-546.

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